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1. Object and method of the research
The bill having the title Private Law Code of Hungary (hereinafter referred to as PLC)1, 
presented before the House of Representatives by minister of justice Pál Pesthy on the 
1st of March 1928, took a prominent place in the history of the civil law codiﬁ cation in 
Hungary. Although the bill has never entered into force it nevertheless was of particular 
signiﬁ cance since it was applied in practice and functioned as customary law referred to 
as “uncodiﬁ ed code”. In my paper the institution of alimony will be discussed in a com-
parative way in the light of the bill in question and its 19th century antecedents.
The system of marital property law was primarily formed by the judicial practice 
based on the traditional customary law in Hungary in the 19th century. This system was 
modiﬁ ed by denominational legal norms pertaining to the marriage bond in so far as 
marital property law was the pecuniary consequence of rights and duties of a moral kind 
between the spouses. The late adoption of civil law codiﬁ cation led to the survival of the 
plurality of legal sources regulating marital property even after the ﬁ rst Hungarian secu-
larized uniform Matrimonial Causes Act (Act 31 of 1894, hereinafter referred to as MA) 
had come into force as supplement to marriage bond law. This Act regulated only some 
institutions of property law and as we will see, it did not do it in an exhaustive manner. 
A legal historian can only try to describe the duality of judicial practice2 and statutory 
law – including the ﬁ rst reading of the bill (General Civil Code, hereinafter referred to 
1 Magyarország Magánjogi Törvénykönyve [Private Law Code of Hungary], Budapest 1928.
2 See in the ﬁ rst place T. Fabinyi, A polgári perrendtartás törvénye és joggyakorlata II [The Code of 
Civil Procedure and its practice II], Budapest 1931; L. Ladányi, Bíráskodás házassági perekben [Jurisdiction 
in matrimonial cases], Budapest 1910; D. Nagy, A házassági jog és a Kuria gyakorlata [Matrimonial law and 
judicial practice of the Curia], Budapest 1941.
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as GCC)3 and resorting to the help of the comprehensive works of civil law scholars4. 
Judicial practice concerning temporary and ﬁ nal alimony is described on the basis of my 
own archival research.
2. The legal effect of marriage on persons
The legal effect of marriage on persons refer to the rights and duties of a moral nature 
which spouses enjoy and owe to each other and which originate from their valid matri-
monial contract. The moral nature of these rights and duties does not terminate their legal 
nature since these rights and duties entail pecuniary consequences and thus determine 
matrimonial property and inheritance law. In legal literature5 it was emphasized that 
the power of the husband similar to manus in Roman law and the German Munt was 
unknown in Hungarian law both at the time of Werbőczy and later. But husband was the 
“head of the family”, which was generally believed to be due to “the nature of marital 
cohabitation”6. This position of the husband can explain the fact that alimony – although 
being an institution of property law – was, in legal literature, dealt with in the area of the 
legal effects of marriage on persons. 
According to the principle established by judicial practice the husband as “the head 
of the family”7 fulﬁ ls his “spousal (and paternal) obligation”8 when providing mainte-
nance to his wife and underage children. In respect of maintenance the wife was taken 
into consideration in the same way as an underage child. Most Hungarian women had no 
professional educational background and conducted no gainful activity even in the sec-
ond part of the 19th century, thus alimony continued to be interpreted as the consequence 
of the factual circumstances of the time9.
3 A Magyar Általános Polgári Törvénykönyv tervezete, első szöveg [Bill of General Civil Code of Hun-
gary, ﬁ rst draft], Budapest 1900.
4 See in the ﬁ rst place I. Frank, A közigazság törvénye Magyarhonban [Law of public justice in Hun-
gary], Buda 1845; B. Grosschmid, A Házasság törvény (1894. XXXI. t.–cz.) [The Matrimonial Causes Act 
(Act 31 of 1894)], vol. 1–2, Budapest 1908; M. Herczeg, Magyar családi és örökösödési jog [Matrimonial 
and inheritance law in Hungary], Budapest 1885; G. Jancsó, A magyar házassági és házastársi öröklési jog 
[Matrimonial law and marital inheritance law in Hungary], Budapest 1901; K. Szladits, A magyar magánjog 
vázlata [The sketch of private law in Hungary], Budapest 1909; G. Zachár, A magyar magánjog alaptanai 
[Fundamental doctrines of Hungarian private law], Budapest 1912; I. Zlinszky, A magyar magánjog mai 
érvényben különös tekintettel a gyakorlat igényeire [Hungarian private law in force with special regard to the 
claims of practice], Budapest 1902.
5 K. Szladits, A házastársak közötti személyes jogviszony [Personal legal relation between the spouses], 
[in:] Magyar jogi lexikon, ed. M. Dezső, vol. 4, Budapest 1903, pp. 118–120; G. Jancsó, A magyar házassá-
gi..., pp. 571–573; L. Tóth, A magyar nőkről (Függelék Gide Pál: A nők joga című művéhez) [About Hungar-
ian women (Appendix to the book Right of Women of Pál Gide)], Budapest 1887, p. 40 and pp. 400–405.
6 G. Jancsó, A magyar házassági..., p. 575 and I. Zlinszky, A magyar magánjog..., p. 901.
7 Curia No. 5889/1885, No 9243/1892 and No. 4/1897. When it is not especially denoted see the deci-
sions of the Curia by M. Dezső (ed.): Felsőbíróságaink elvi határozatai. A m. kir. Curia és a kir. táblák elvi 
jelentőségű döntéseinek rendszeres gyűjteménye [Principal decisions of our superior courts. Systematical col-
lection of decisions of fundamental importance of the Hungarian Royal Curia and the royal courts of appeal], 
vol. 2–10, Budapest 1883–1901.    
8 Curia No. 6843/1883, see also G. Jancsó, A magyar házassági..., p. 578.
9 G. Jancsó, A magyar házassági..., p. 578.
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3. Alimony during marriage with the parties’ cohabitation
During marital cohabitation it was the husband’s obligation – and the wife could not 
waive it for the beneﬁ t of the husband10 – to provide decent maintenance to the family 
and cover all expenses connected with the matrimony. This obligation was terminated 
upon the death of the wife since it was linked to her person. Consequently the wife’s 
entitlement did not devolve to her heirs or third parties. Maintenance was “decent” if it 
complied with the ﬁ nancial situation and social status of the husband. In judicial prac-
tice11 and also in the GCC12 maintenance basically covered accommodation, food, cloth-
ing and intellectual needs. Likewise, the husband had to “cover the medical costs of the 
treatment of the wife”13. 
The PLC – in a laconic but logic manner – sets out only three components of the 
“decent” maintenance (ﬁ nancial situation, earning capacity, and social status)14. In the 
earlier practice “decent” maintenance provided for the covering of all costs of marriage, 
too. PLC sets two reasonable limits and § 98 of GCC made it more express: on the one 
hand wife could act for her husband in the name of her husband, within the limits of her 
husband’s ﬁ nancial capacity, but this right to represent could be withdrawn wholly or 
partly for some serious reasons on the other hand15. 
The husband provided maintenance to the common household in-kind. The wife 
could – exceptionally – demand the maintenance in money only if the husband refused 
to provide it in-kind or if his or his relatives’ unbearable conduct made it impossible for 
her to enjoy this maintenance16. The husband could not demand that his wife should con-
tribute to the maintenance of the family from her own property. However, during mar-
riage the husband disposed of and handled her dowry (allatura), which had been given 
to her by her father, brother or any other person17 except the husband for lightening the 
ﬁ nancial burden of the marriage. Thus the dowry (movable and immovable property and 
property rights) constituted the property of the wife over which the husband exercised 
his exclusive beneﬁ cial rights. In addition, the wife could let her husband administer her 
own separate property. She could do it either by an express statement of will or tacitly18. 
The husband was not accountable for the decrease in the separate property of his wife 
unless stipulated otherwise in the contract, and he did not have to refund it. Thus the in-
come from the separate property was used for covering the expenses of the household. If 
the husband did not provide decent maintenance to his family and his wife had to secure 
it from her separate property, she did not have the right to demand its reimbursement 
10 Curia No. 476/1898 and I. G. No. 513/1901, explained by J. Bajzáth, Ideiglenes nőtartás [Temporary 
alimony], Jogtudományi Közlöny 1813/52 p. 462.
11 Curia No. 6843/1882, No. 5889/1885 and No. 7614/1885, explained by G. Jancsó, A magyar házassá-
gi..., p. 580. 
12 GCC 96 §.
13 Curia No. 3939/1884, No. 1356/1896 and 9243/1892. See the same principle in GCC 96 §.
14 PLC 113 §.
15 PLC 115 §.
16 Curia I. G. No. 198/1899, see in Ügyvédek Lapja 1899/32.
17 Act 7 of 1886 21 §.
18 I. Zlinszky, A magyar magánjog..., p. 899.
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even if the marriage was terminated, nor could her husband demand from his wife or her 
heirs the money he had spent on maintenance.
PLC19 changed this traditional custom to a certain extent and so adjusted itself to the 
requirements of the epoch. Previously it was a natural thing that in legal relation between 
husband and wife “woman does the housework and aids her husband by her agency in 
his gainful employment” and consequently “she makes a contribution with her further 
income to the payment of the household costs”. What both in GCC20 and PLC made up 
a new element was that “she was required to conduct gainful activity when living condi-
tions of the family demanded so”. This rule of the “uncodiﬁ ed code” stroke roots in the 
judicial practice very fast21 because of the subsidiary character of the aforementioned 
principle, although maintenance of children and wife remained a task of the husband in 
the future as well22.
4. Alimony during marriage on occasion of the separation of the parties
Discontinuing marital cohabitation did not terminate the husband’s obligation to maintain 
his wife since the marriage was not terminated by this discontinuing either. This life situ-
ation could occur in four different legal situations. After the entry into force of the uni-
form state divorce law as independent of denomination of the parties23, separation from 
bed-and-board (separatio a thoro et mensa) as a residue of canon matrimonial law meant 
a legal solution only for those who wanted to maintain the bond itself either because of 
their religious conviction or because they hoped to be able to eliminate the causes of the 
disintegration of the marriage during separation. In the course of my research I examined 
all the matrimonial cases initiated at the royal court of Pécs between 1895 and 1918, the 
cases amounting to 1842. However, I could ﬁ nd only one case of this kind. 
After 21 years of cohabitation Mari K. left her husband, András G., whom she had 
married in 1875 by the rites of the Roman Catholic Church. Three out of their four chil-
dren had become grown up by then. The irretrievable breakdown of their marriage was 
caused by the cruelty of the husband. One and a half year after the court had rejected 
András G.’s divorce petition on the grounds of desertion, Mari K. applied to the royal 
court for separation from bed-and-board. The court granted separation, declared the hus-
band’s fault, granted to the wife the child’s custody and ordered the husband to make 
payments for the support of the child. The husband was also ordered to pay alimony to 
the amount of 12 Ft per month from the day of the divorce petition i.e. from the 22nd of 
June 1898 until the death or a new marriage of the woman24. The two superior courts up-
held the decision of the ﬁ rst instance court in the course of a review initiated ex ofﬁ cio25. 
19 PLC 116 §.
20 GCC 99 §.
21 Curia No. 2033/1928 and No. 5724/1931, explained by D. Nagy, A házassági jog..., p. 171. 
22 Curia No. 2604/1929, explained by D. Nagy, A házassági jog..., p. 171.
23 1st of October 1895.
24 Baranya Megyei Levéltár [County Archive of Baranya (hereinafter CAB)] VII/2b II/1898/249 
16219p/1898.  
25 CAB VII/2b II/1898/249 544p/1900 and 1861p/1900.
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Like in the ﬁ nancial matters, thus also with respect to the issue of alimony, separation 
had the same legal effect as divorce, nevertheless since the bond still existed and matri-
mony could be restored at any time, in the cases where separation from bed-and-board 
was sought the court ordered temporary alimony for the period of separation or until the 
death or a new marriage of the wife.
Secondly, it should be noted that the parties could request the court that it should 
order them to live separate and apart from bed and table for the period preceding the de-
cision on the suit for nullity or divorce26. In such cases the husband had to pay temporary 
alimony until the closure of the proceedings. 
Thirdly, the court could also order separation ex ofﬁ cio in cases for nullity27 or when 
trying to reconcile the parties in a divorce case. In the case of divorce petitions on so 
called absolute grounds for divorce, courts “usually” ordered separation; or rather the 
court could only resign from ordering it if there was no hope for reconciliation28. In the 
case of relative grounds for divorce separation was always ordered, even if the parties 
had lived separately for a long time before ﬁ ling the divorce petition. The period of sepa-
ration was 6–12 months under statutory law; however my research shows that judges 
always applied the shortest, i.e. the six-month period29. Temporary alimony was limited 
to this period of time. 
Finally, the wife could demand temporary alimony without initiating separation or 
divorce proceedings against her husband living apart. The MA – quite obviously – did 
not cover such a situation. Therefore only the rules established in judicial practice were 
followed30. The provisions of the MA were regarded as the guiding principle when as-
sessing temporary alimony. What accounted for this “contradiction” was the uniform 
concept of temporary duty as functioning in judicial practice regardless of which of the 
four above mentioned situation was at stake. 
Before the MA had entered into force, the judicial practice acknowledged the claim 
of the woman against her husband for temporary alimony for the time of the continuing 
of the proceedings if separation was not due to her fault. Although the divorce law of 
the MA that emphasized fault principle contained several provisions which could only 
be interpreted as quasi punishment imposed on the party at fault, temporary alimony did 
not depend on whether the wife was at fault or whether she was blamed for causing the 
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. In fact the issue of fault could not be decided31 
in a judgment ordering living apart (ex ofﬁ cio for the sake of reconciliation or upon the 
parties’ request for the time of the proceedings)32. Thus in such cases the wife was uncon-
ditionally entitled to temporary alimony. Contrary to this, the fact that the woman was at 
fault excluded temporary alimony if the court separated the parties from bed-and-board 
because separation had the same legal effect as dissolution in respect of ﬁ nancial ar-
26 MA 72 and 98 §§.
27 MA 72 §.
28 MA 99 §.
29 E.Cs. Herger, A nővételtől az állami anyakönyvvezetőig. A magyar házassági köteléki jog és az európai 
modellek [From purchase of woman to the public register. Matrimonial law in Hungary and the European 
models], Budapest–Pécs 2006, pp. 188–189, pp. 217–232.
30 Curia No. 157/1986.
31 Curia No. 1306/1899.
32 Curia No. 2805/1897.
72 Eszter Cs. Herger
rangements33. In the same way the wife at fault could not be granted temporary alimony 
if she had requested it against her husband living apart without initiating separation or di-
vorce proceedings. Thus temporary alimony was not granted if the woman or the woman 
as well as her husband could be attributed a fault for the breakdown of their cohabitation, 
nor could alimony be granted to her if she was blamed for “injurious conduct” while 
living apart. It is still to be examined what the courts qualiﬁ ed as “injurious conduct”. 
Although rough treatment of the wife by her husband was usually admissible as 
a lawful cause of the wife’s leaving her husband’s house, the following decision shows 
that the term “usually” made the roughness relative. While taking into consideration the 
parties’ social status and educational background, we may say that “amongst common 
peasants the fact that the husband slaps his wife twice in the face for talking back is not 
to be regarded as a cause of such a nature and measure which could justify the woman’s 
leaving her husband’s house and living apart”. If the woman did not prove that her hus-
band had driven her out of the house and that she had made steps to return to him in vain, 
she could not demand alimony from her husband34.
In 1895 in the opinion of the Curia the degree of “beating the wife” which did not 
qualify as a criminal offence did not constitute “injurious conduct”. At the end of the 
19th century in Hungary the position of the husband as the head of the family entailed 
the entitlement to inﬂ icting light corporal punishment. Such was the position adopted by 
the superior court whose decisions were authoritative for all other courts of the country. 
Moreover, as the wife had to follow her husband to his residence, the husband was found 
to be at fault only if the wife had tried to restore conjugal life in vain after the expulsion. 
Three years later the Curia also gave the opinion on the “stubborn or over-sensitive” 
conduct of the wife. In its opinion “injuries of a lesser importance” should be pardoned 
by the wife “for the sake of maintaining family life”, but if she fails to do so, and her 
“stubbornness” results in the termination of conjugal life, she cannot demand any ﬁ nan-
cial provision from her husband35. 
Being at fault or not at fault – as condition of temporary alimony – raised principal 
questions at the time of private law codiﬁ cation, too. In 1914, Miksa Teller, the well-
known lawyer criticized36 § 31 at the second reading because it provided for the tem-
porary alimony to woman regardless of whether she had a lawful cause to live apart or 
not. However the PLC did not regulate the area of divorce law and did not change the 
fault principle. So it was logical that the PLC turned back to the traditional custom and 
acknowledged the claim of the woman against her husband for temporary alimony only 
when she was not at fault37. 
33 MA 105 §.
34 Curia No. 10635/1895.
35 Curia No. 4/1898.
36 M. Teller, A vétkes nő ideiglenes tartása [The temporary alimony of woman at fault], “Jogtudományi 
Közlöny” 1914/16, pp. 164–165.
37 PLC 118 § (1).
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5. Alimony after the dissolution of marriage
Before the entry into force of the MA, denominational laws usually considered the ob-
ligation of the husband to provide alimony to be terminated upon the dissolution of the 
bond. In the case of evangelical parties if the wife proved “such facts” which “might 
justify derogation from this rule”, ﬁ nal alimony could be granted38. Among the “sub-
stantial causes” there were detectable such as the wife’s incapability to work because of 
the husband’s behavior or that the wife was impecunious and – although not due to her 
husband’s fault – incapable of working at the same time. However, the general principle 
was that 
the obligation to pay alimony fell on the husband during the existence of the marriage bond, and if 
the latter happened to be dissolved (in the case of non-Catholic parties) and the ﬁ nancial arrange-
ment was not provided for in the judgment of divorce, the husband would be obliged to pay alimony 
until the ﬁ nancial arrangement was produced39. 
Contrary to this, MA created a situation far more favorable for the woman. Each of 
its drafts40 stuck to the position that the husband’s obligation arising from his position as 
the head of the family to maintain his non-faulty ex-wife was not terminated by the dis-
solution of marriage. The in subsidio entitlement of the non-faulty wife was explained in 
the ministerial reasoning of the statute by the fact that it was a “law in action in Hungary 
too”, and then it was underpinned by some similar provisions of the ALR, the Code Civil 
and the ABGB41. Thus the intention of the lawmaker was to maintain the non-faulty 
woman’s social and ﬁ nancial status enjoyed by her during marriage in this way, since 
“the husband, who caused the dissolution of marriage by his injurious conduct and thus 
deprived her wife of the ﬁ nancial advantages which she could enjoy in the conjugal life, 
deserves to be obliged to compensate her for the loss of these advantages42”.
The parties could freely agree on ﬁ nal alimony, the woman could even waive it43. 
Among the matrimonial cases initiated at the royal court in Pécs between 1895 and 1918 
there were annually less than 10% of the claims and counterclaims which, among other 
things, requested ﬁ nal alimony. This can only partly be explained by the fact that the ﬁ -
nancial conditions of the women did not make alimony necessary. It was rather due to the 
fact that as a result of the fault theory adhered to in the divorce law such a claim could be 
made only if the woman was the petitioner or she herself requested in the counterclaim 
that the marriage be dissolved and her husband be found at fault. In the examined 24-
-year period the wife was found at fault in more than half of the cases (female respond-
ent: 49,5% + female petitioner: 0,8%). 
38 Royal Court of Appeal in Budapest No. 41743/1885, reported by G. Jancsó, A magyar házassági..., 
p. 599.
39 Curia No. 1376/1892.
40 B. Grosschmid, A Házasság..., vol. 2, pp. 738–740.
41 Ibidem, vol. 2, pp. 738-740.
42 G. Jancsó, A magyar házassági..., p. 607.
43 MA 92 §.
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Apart from some exceptional years44, the pattern was the same in a yearly breakdown 
and statistical ﬁ gures showed a similar tendency nationwide. I found one case dated back 
to the 1912, where the court approved of the counterclaim of a woman that was found at 
fault and yet was granted alimony.
The marriage contracted between József B. and Anna K. by the rites of the Roman 
Catholic Church in 1884 was dissolved by the royal court in Pécs in 1912 on the ground 
of wife’s willful and unjustiﬁ ed leaving of her husband. At the same time the court found 
the respondent (the wife) at fault. The court approved of the respondent’s claim for ali-
mony of 600 crowns (contrary to article 90 of the MA) and ordered the petitioner to 
pay “ﬁ ve crowns monthly in advance as of 1st August 1911, the amount overdue in total 
within 15 days under penalty of distrait, whilst the other installments at the beginning of 
each month till the death of the respondent”. The reasoning of the court was as follows: 
the petitioner made no demur to the request of the respondent but offered to pay ﬁ ve 
crowns per month instead of the payment of 600 crowns. This offer was accepted by the 
respondent. The fact that the wife deserted the petitioner after two years of cohabitation 
and 26 years before the ﬁ ling of the petition made his generosity even more surprising. 
Thus the court regarded the litigants’ right of disposal as stronger than the negative le-
gal consequence attached to fault. There was an unusually short period of time within 
which the case was settled. 24 days lapsed between ﬁ ling the petition and the passing of 
44 E.Cs. Herger, A nővételtől..., p. 190 and p. 273.
Diagram 1. Matrimonial cases initiated at the royal court in Pecs (1895–1918), N = 1 842 cases.
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* In the 14,3% of the matrimonial cases there are no information about the fault of the parties either be-
cause these were not divorce cases, or the decision containing the declaration of fault got lost.
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the judgment. The respondent made no defence and did not object to the dissolution of 
marriage45. 
The principle applied in this judgment complied with the practice ﬁ rmly established 
in the next years: in 1919, the Curia provided the courts with a possibility to adjudicate 
on the merits in case of the claim of the woman against her husband for ﬁ nal alimony 
in the divorce case even under the circumstances when her claim was not based on the 
statutory law but on the contract of the parties46. 
If the woman requested alimony in a separate property law action and the claim was 
based on the statutory law, the ruling of the court in reference to the fault had to be taken 
into consideration as res judicata even if it had been made under the denominational laws 
before the adoption of the MA47. Whenever the claim was based on a marriage contract 
the fault principle was of no importance.
Alimony – for practical purposes – had to be paid in cash and usually in advance, in 
monthly installments. However derogation was possible in case of the persons engaged 
in agriculture and manufacturing industries48. The alimony imposed could be increased 
if at ﬁ rst it was assessed at a low level due to the husband’s ﬁ nancial status which later 
improved. It could also be increased if an income of the wife was lost through no fault 
of her49. In case of the decrease or cancellation of the alimony the judicial practice has 
been changed after 1895. This meant that after the entry into force of the MA the alimony 
imposed could not be decreased or cancelled in the practice of the courts50 because the 
MA did not contain provisions in this regard. Based on the opinion of our eminent pri-
vate legal expert the courts followed this practice because the opposite practice might 
have made the not-at-fault wife’s ﬁ nancial status unstable. Therefore the question of 
cancellation of ﬁ nal alimony was reﬂ ective of the situation in which the regulation of 
statutory law (or rather, the silence of the regulation about this issue) contradicted the 
earlier customary law. For a long time the statutory law regulation was interpreted as 
a prohibitory regulation.
This interpretation was changed51 after the entry into force of the Code of Civil 
Procedure52. The new interpretation was based on the general principle of article 413 of 
the Code, which provided for possibility of altering the content and the measure of an 
imposed service (in this case alimony) if the circumstances had been radically changed. 
This solution meant the adoption of standpoint of the contemporary legal experts53. 
Therefore, no tasks remained for the PLC to regulate the question of the ﬁ nal alimony 
and this is why the PLC left the crystallized legal practice untouched for a long time.
45 CAB VII/2b II/1912/255 10612p/1912.
46 Curia P. III No. 1009/1919, explained by Tihamér Fabinyi, A polgári..., p. 159.
47 G. Jancsó, A magyar házassági..., p. 605.
48 Ibidem, p. 608.
49 MA § 91.
50 G. Jancsó, A magyar házassági, p. 610.
51 Curia P. III No. 2666/1916, explained by D. Nagy, A házassági jog..., p. 266.
52 Act 1 of 1911, entered into force in 1915.
53 See for example Béla Malonyai, Végleges nőtartás felemelése és leszállítása [Increase and decrease of 
ﬁ nal alimony], Jogtudományi Közlöny 1918/16 pp. 125-127.
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S u m m a r y
The paper discusses the extent to which the 19th century regulations of alimonies as awarded within 
the frame of matrimonial relationships had an impact on the formation of claims of alimony as found 
in the Hungarian Code of Private Law of 1928. The paper discusses the alimony as paid to one of the 
spouses at the time when the matrimonial tie was still continued but also when the alimony was granted 
as a temporary device and also when it was awarded after the divorce decree had been granted.
